

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Poland

REPORT

50X1-HUM

SUBJECT Attitudes and Orientation of the
Polish Military Officer Corps

DATE DISTR.

8 MAR 1962

NO. PAGES

1

REFERENCES

RD

50X1-HUM

DATE OF
INFO.PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

50X1-HUM

1. A report containing the views
on the attitudes and orientation of the Polish
officer corps

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE	#	x	ARMY	#	x	NAVY	#	x	AIR	#	x	NSA	#	x	OCR	USIA	#	x	DIA	x
																			JCS	x

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

Page Denied

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

Poland: Attitudes and Orientation of Polish Military Officer Corps.

Higher Training Standards in the Polish Armed Forces

In the last five years the educational system in the Polish armed forces has allegedly undergone sweeping changes. Whereas formerly the teachers had been a random, unselective group, nowadays a considerable proportion of them is at the university graduate level. There are "lots of psychologists." The faculty of the army's Political Academy (presumably the Feliks Dzierzynski Military Political Academy in Warsaw) is "a professional political and propaganda corps." In the Navy, the Westerplatte Higher Naval School in Gdansk for officers, which the source attended, has established high-level chairs of various sciences and psychology.

Question of Officer Loyalty.

[redacted] the degree of loyalty to Polish national policy and the Party in the Polish officer corps depends to a great extent upon which service is considered. For example, political loyalty in the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego - KBW) is high, as it is among the border guards (Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza - WOP). There are fairly obvious reasons for this. In the first place, many of the "alumni" of the late, unlamented Security Police (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa - UB) are now in the ranks of the KBW and the WOP. [redacted] very few former UB members went back into civilian life, despite the much-publicized reports to that effect appearing after October 1956. Secondly, as the KBW and WOP are the forces primarily concerned with internal security and the integrity of the national borders, it is only natural that a high degree of political loyalty is a prerequisite for service in these troop organizations.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

The "least revolutionized" services are the air force and the navy. To a great extent, the heroes of the air force are the Poles who fought in the RAF or the Polish forces in exile. Perhaps for this reason, there is still considerable residual Western orientation among air force officers. The navy, traditionally a conservative arm enjoying more frequent contacts outside of Poland, is also difficult to restrict to the Party line. These political differences are heightened [redacted] by [redacted] a high degree of inter-service rivalry and even antagonism.

50X1-HUM

Exploitation of Soviet Propaganda.

Dissemination and exploitation of pro-Soviet propaganda [redacted] are "tremendous." Interestingly enough, whereas at one time this barrage met with comparative indifference, particularly on the part of the officer corps, today [redacted] it is easy to assemble an audience, particularly when the theme of a meeting is Soviet astronautics or some similarly up-to-date topic. Indeed, [redacted] there is little difficulty even in recruiting listeners for talks or meetings on such subjects as Soviet agricultural statistics, etc.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

Party Membership a Virtual Prerequisite for Army Officer Corps.

Since 1959, [] great changes have come about in the makeup of the Polish Army officer corps. Before that time, "it was enough that an officer was not against the government." Now, one of the primary conditions for officer status is that the individual be a Party member, or at least a candidate. In the [] WOP organization, of 400 officers, only 20 were not Party members or candidates (and these presumably had been officers before 1959).

50X1-HUM

In contrast to the army, a greater proportion of air force and naval officers is non-Party. Nevertheless, each Party member in the latter services has the specific duty of urging and pressuring his fellow officers into Party candidacy.

50X1-HUM

[] proportion of the officer corps in the various services was made up of hard-core believers in communism, [] only one in ten believed in the Party and its policies, and [] there was in fact still considerable anti-Russian and derivatively anti-Soviet sentiment. The majority of the officers, however, can best be described as "neutral" - neither especially anti-communist nor pro-communist.

The younger the officers are, the more receptive they are to communism. This is a fairly recent change, [] and is borne out by the fact that at least 50% of new officers can be described as "soft on communism."

50X1-HUM

Armed Forces Discipline.

50X1-HUM

Traditionally, discipline in the Polish armed forces had always been rigid ("corporal's discipline"). Officers could not be criticized, and their word was law ("Doctrine 01-02"). For a few years in the mid-1950's, [] this changed to [] "soldier's discipline," presumably the Polish version of the somewhat relaxed discipline and officer-enlisted man fraternization attempted by the Soviets until the disastrous lessons of the Soviet-Finnish war. In the recent past, the old, stricter discipline has been reinstituted. Today, for instance, officers are allowed to deprive soldiers of their furloughs, a device [] described as an "excellent form of punishment." Offenses are harshly dealt with as they used to be in the days of Doctrine 01-02.

50X1-HUM

Censorship of Personal Correspondence.

In the years immediately preceding 1956, the personal correspondence of Polish soldiers had been controlled by "spot-check." The life of the soldier was so narrowly restricted that portraits by civilian photographers were not allowed. After 1956, [] a period of some three years, personal correspondence was relatively free. Today, however, it is "regulated by norms;" every second letter is now reviewed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

Surveillance of Sensitive Personnel.

At the same time, steps have been taken to provide closer, very discreet surveillance of persons in the army holding [redacted] "important positions."

50X1-HUM

Emergency Control of Civilians.

50X1-HUM

In case of war or other national emergency, [redacted] it is foreseen that control of the Polish civilian populace will be imposed under WOP and KBW, according to present planning. In all probability, the Citizens' Militia (Milicja Obywatelska - MO) would also be pressed into use at such time for internal control of the public. Each geographic area of Poland is divided into special commands for these purposes. As an example of internal security mobilization, [redacted] in the spring of 1960 army units were alerted although for an emergency. Nothing was given out as to the reason for the move, and it was not until after the event that it could be divined. It seemed that the Polish government was planning an overall [redacted] in meat prices and, presumably because of hardships this might create, feared popular demonstrations or even an uprising. Accordingly an alert was called to deter any such contingency. After it had been determined by the government that there was no serious popular reaction, the alert was called off. No public announcement accompanied any phase of this action.

50X1-HUM

Listening to Western Radio.

With respect to official attitudes toward the fairly common Polish practice of listening to Western radio programs, matters are now the way they were before October 1956. Youth organizations and, in a general way, the armed forces are interested in the listening habits of the public. [redacted] it could be assumed that excessive attentiveness to Western programs would result in derogatory entries in the official dossier of any Polish citizen.

50X1-HUM

Western Diplomatic Posts in Poland as Spy Centers.

50X1-HUM

[redacted] special lectures on the subject of the role of Western embassies and consulates in Poland [redacted] were treated in the training curriculum as "centers of espionage,"

50X1-HUM

Anti-German Propaganda.

From 1959 on, thorough armed forces indoctrination in anti-Western propaganda became a primary Polish goal. Detailed charges were made against the Adenauer government, and old as well as newly discovered horrors of World War II were

CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

[REDACTED] 50X1-HUM

dragged out and stressed to the soldiery. Some attention was devoted to the "war impetus of the United States" but without great detail.

[REDACTED] until 1959 most Poles, even in the armed forces, were almost ready to forget their formerly ingrained hatred of Germans. The hammering of propaganda since 1959, however, has successfully whipped up new fears. On the subject of the Soviet Union, armed forces indoctrination courses have ceased to try to put over "big brother" friendship, which had significantly failed to gain adherents, and now have substituted the more practical consideration that the Soviet Union is the only bulwark against German revanchists and revisionists who want to take back Polish lands. [REDACTED] 50X1-HUM

[REDACTED] today even the mention of the infamous Katyn massacre in army circles brings the reaction: "So what? The Soviets have the only force in being capable of defeating the West Germans." [REDACTED] 50X1-HUM

CONFIDENTIAL